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1 
Introduction: The ‘What’, ‘When’ and ‘Where’ of the Global 1989 
George Lawson 
 
 
Laughter and forgetting 
One of the central motifs of Milan Kundera’s, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, is the 
ways in which the present works to distort the past and, in particular, how ideologues seek to 
control the present by manipulating the past. To that end, Kundera tells the story of a 
photograph taken of two leading Czech communists, Vladimír Clementis and Klement 
Gottwald, celebrating the takeover of state power by communists in Czechoslovakia in 1948. 
The picture was later doctored to remove Clementis, following charges brought against him 
for ‘deviationism’ and ‘bourgeois nationalism’. The erasure of Clementis from the 
photograph temporarily removed one of the leading architects of the Czech post-war state 
from the country’s history. Clementis was denounced, put on trial and, eventually, executed. 
In some ways, of course, the very everydayness of this episode is its most disturbing aspect. 
The routinisastion of coercion within totalitarian states – the use of murder and 
imprisonment, the control of populations via vast coercive apparatuses, the establishment of 
insidious networks of corruption – was the norm rather than the exception. As such, the 
events of 1989 and the disappearance of what Daniel Chirot (1996) calls ‘tyrannies of 
certitude’ from most parts of Central and Eastern Europe are acts well worth celebrating.  
Alongside the pronounced celebrations which marked the passing of state socialism in 
1989 lies a second widely held view – that 1989 serves the ur-demarcation point in 
contemporary world politics. Indeed, both academics and policy makers tend to use 1989 and 
its surrogate frames (such as Cold War/post-Cold War) as the principal normative, analytical 
and empirical shorthands for delineating past and present. And as with the celebrations over 
1989 and its associated events, such abbreviations are made for often sound reasons. Not only 
was 1989 a significant event for those people living in the immediate Soviet sphere of 
influence, it had important ramifications for those inhabiting (now often former) socialist 
states around the world. Elsewhere, too, the events of 1989 served to disrupt existing 
patterns: the European Union saw its centre of gravity shift, at least to some extent, from west 
to east; recent years have seen a rise (or return) of Asian powers which may, in turn, 
prefigure a shift in the metageography of international politics from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific; and in the West itself, and in particular its fulcrum – the transatlantic alliance – the 
loss of the Soviet ‘other’ has engendered an overriding sense of anomie. No longer quite clear 
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what it is against, the transatlantic alliance seems equally unclear about what it is for. 
Alongside this topographical shake-up can be found important intellectual challenges: how to 
conceptualise the primary fact of the post-Cold War order – US power; how to employ 
suitable normative frames for capturing issues of sovereignty, intervention and responsibility 
in the contemporary world; and how to comprehend a complex security climate signified by 
novel notions of war, shifting meanings of combatant/non-combatant, and the changing 
character of terrorism both by and against states. In short, it is nigh-on impossible to imagine 
a world without 1989 – there are few issues which appear untouched by it.  
This book does not seek to overturn these two core assumptions – they stand as the 
principal indicators of the influence of 1989 and its associated processes. But the book does 
seek to question three issues which lie behind, or perhaps lurk beneath, their easy acceptance. 
First, although the events of 1989 are, to be sure, acts worthy of celebration, they have also 
engendered some unintended, yet important, consequences, perhaps most notable amongst 
them exposure of the chronic weaknesses contained in a hyperventilated form of liberal 
capitalism. One of the core wagers of this volume is that the collapse of communism and the 
end of the Cold War have produced mixed, paradoxical, even contradictory outcomes. 
Although the political, economic and cultural orders generated after the fall of communism 
have, for the most part, been an improvement on what was in place before, this has not 
always been clear cut. Substantively – as the contributions to this volume make clear – 1989 
has bequeathed an ambivalent legacy. 
Second, although 1989 can serve as a useful barometer between old and new, we 
should be careful about the general utility of this shorthand – there have been considerable 
continuities between the pre- and post-1989 eras. Four chapters in this book make this point 
forcefully. John Hobson argues that policies of post-Cold War intervention should be seen as 
the latest exemplars of an older suite of ideas rooted in nineteenth century Western 
international thought. Aviezer Tucker highlights the impact of totalitarian legacies on Russian 
and Chinese development since 1989, looking at how the restoration of autocratic rule in 
these countries has produced a ruling class of post-totalitarian nomenklatura which seeks to 
strip the country’s assets rather than engage in contractual politics. Rick Saull’s discussion of 
the Middle East argues that, by removing the one-dimensional straightjacket associated with 
Eurocentric thinking and by replacing it with a view that embraces the chronic unevenness, 
multiplicity and complexity of world politics, we begin to see the importance of local 
patterns of development on global politics. In her contribution, Saskia Sassen points to the 
ways in which post-Cold War capitalist expansion constitutes a return to long-established 
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exploitative practices, albeit on novel scales. In this way, a complex picture emerges in terms 
of the temporality of 1989, one which embraces important continuities alongside and, to 
some extent instead of, simple notions of ‘all change’.  
Third, although the principal events and effects of 1989 took place in Europe, the 
volume looks beyond this immediate zone of impact in order to explore the many spaces of 
the ‘global 1989’. Laure Delcour indicates the ways in which 1989 has brought into question 
core aspects of European integration, while William Outhwaite concentrates on the crisis of 
the European left invoked by the loss of socialism as an ‘actual existing alternative’ to market 
democracy. Michael Cox widens this lens to investigate how the post-Cold War era has 
weakened the Western alliance, perhaps fatally. Fred Halliday goes further still in exploring 
the diverse impact of 1989 on the thirty-odd former allies of the Soviet Union in the Third 
World. As with a need for subtle assessment of the multiple times of 1989, so there appears 
to be an equally pronounced need to understand the fracturing of space engendered by 1989 
and its aftermath.  
What have we learned from ‘1989 and all that’? Perhaps the wrong lessons as Chris 
Armbruster, Marc Devore and Barbara Falk explore. Armbruster argues that the European 
experience of violence during the twentieth century engendered legacies that contributed 
significantly to the revolutions of 1989. In contrast, the revolutions of 1989 provided a model 
of large-scale transformation relatively unscarred by such violence. Marc Devore traces how 
the revolution in military affairs led US hawks to believe (erroneously) that cutting-edge 
technologies could be used to reshape international order. Barbara Falk traces ten poorly 
conceived lessons which US policy makers drew from the collapse of communism, lessons 
which were subsequently employed to legitimise the invasion of Iraq. These themes are 
picked up by Arne Westad in his concluding chapter to the volume. As Westad notes, twenty 
years after the events of 1989, it is possible to see as much continuities as there have been 
changes to the basic marrow of world politics. His chapter joins the others in replacing the 
‘cliché of 1989’ with a more sober assessment of the past two decades. What is clear is that 
we should neither laugh (in triumphalism) about the events of 1989, nor forget (in an attempt 
to control the past) the lessons of the post-1989 era. After all, as Kundera notes (1981: 3), 
‘the struggle against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting’. The remainder of 
this introduction substantiates the importance of this struggle and lays out the general framing 
for the volume as a whole, understood as investigation of the ‘what’ (substantive issues), 
‘when’ (times) and ‘where’ (spaces) of ‘the global 1989’. 
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The ‘What’ of 1989? 
In many ways, the events of 1989 stand as exemplars of what Nicholas Taleb (2007) calls 
‘black swans’: events which stand as ‘outliers’ from prevailing frames of reference; generate 
a set of impacts beyond their immediate field; and which are subsequently rationalised via 
pre-existing tools of explanation. Certainly, all three of Taleb’s categories are fulfilled by 
1989: the changes which took place in 1989, particularly during the second half of the year, 
were as surprising to most observers as they were to many participants; their impact has been 
extensive, if uneven; and over the past twenty years, there have been no shortage of attempts 
to explain, and sometimes to explain away, their occurrence (e.g. Dahrendorf 1990; Garton 
Ash 1990; Habermas 1990; Tismaneanu (ed.) 1999; Bunce 1999; Sakwa 1999; Kumar 2001; 
Outhwaite and Ray 2005). One of the aims of Taleb’s book is to illustrate how black swans, 
for all the surprise they invoke, occur more frequently than we imagine. And certainly, 
surprise is a constant feature of world history – take as an illustration Lenin’s (1968: 842) 
comment in January 1917 that ‘we, the old, may not live to see the decisive battles of the 
coming revolution’. Before the year was up, of course, the Bolshevik Revolution had begun 
the process not just of reshaping Russian politics and society, but also broader strands of 
international relations. Along with the Bolshevik Revolution, the events of 9/11 and the 
German invasion of Russia in World War II, 1989 stands as an archetype of the continuing 
capacity of human history, even events and processes of considerable magnitude, to surprise.  
Less surprising has been the cottage industry which has sprung up around 1989 over 
the past twenty years. Some Kremlinologists found that Soviet Studies could quite easily be 
translated into post-Soviet Studies. Many transitologists who had previously worked on the 
break-up of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America transplanted their 
models fairly straightforwardly to the blank canvass provided by events in Eastern and 
Central Europe. Political theorists and sociologists surveyed the possibilities and challenges 
of a global era (e.g. Held et al 1999), IR scholars pondered the stability – or not – of a 
unipolar world (e.g. Wohlforth 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008), while many economists 
saw 1989 as marking the final victory of Hayek over Keynes, often becoming directly 
involved in far-reaching privatisation and liberalisation programmes (e.g. Sachs 1994). 
Regardless of diverse orientation and intention, most of these accounts concentrated on three 
core issues: first, establishing the (usually endogenous) causes of the collapse of communism; 
second, assessment of the broader meanings of 1989, mostly in terms of its revolutionary 
quotient; and third, investigation of the consequences of 1989, particularly in Europe. This 
book goes beyond these studies by concentrating on the most important, yet often the most 
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neglected, of these foci – the consequences of 1989 – and by exerting much of its efforts on 
examination of the world beyond Europe. As such, the book does not provide a history, 
revisionist or otherwise, of the events of 1989, nor does it seek to establish (again) why 1989 
happened when and how it did. Rather, the volume is geared at unravelling the complexities 
of time, space and substance associated with the global 1989.  
As John Hobson points out in his chapter for this volume, for both scholars and policy 
makers, 1989 serves as an influential ‘temporal othering’ device, a shorthand used across the 
political spectrum. For liberals, 1989 marked the shift from ‘bad Cold War’ to ‘good post-
Cold War’, liberating the world from an era of conservative order and intervention to a novel 
epoch in which international institutions, multilaterial forms of governance, human rights and 
humanitarian intervention could bury ‘backward’ ideas such as sovereignty, power politics 
and realpolitik. For foreign policy realists, 1989 marked the reverse journey, from ‘good Cold 
War’ to ‘bad post-Cold War’ as bipolar stability was replaced by the instability of a unipolar 
and/or multipolar world, a crisis in global governance, and heightened levels of insecurity 
stemming from a range of security threats: a rising China, a restored Russia, a plethora of 
rogue and failed states, and the emergence of transnational terrorist networks such as al-
Qaeda. John Mearsheimer (1990) was not the only high-profile realist to argue that we would 
soon miss the sureties of the Cold War. And nor was Francis Fukuyama (1989) the only 
liberal to laud the unprecedented possibilities for prosperity and peace inaugurated by the 
demise of the Soviet Empire.1  
For all their differences, both of these positions agreed that something substantial had 
taken place in 1989. The great debate about how to categorise the events of 1989 – as 
revolutions (rectifying (Habermas 1990) or otherwise), refolutions (Garton Ash 1990) or as 
part of a wave of liberal democratic transitions (Rustow 1990; Huntington 1991; Ackerman 
1992) – tended to concentrate on three issues: the failure of revolutionaries to conjure novel 
utopian visions; the considerable continuities between old and new regimes; and their relative 
lack of violence. To start with the first of these, what many observers failed to note was the 
liberal utopia that underpinned 1989. Ideas of freedom, justice and equality may not have 
been new, but they were certainly utopian. As such, participants took these ideals seriously, 
whether this meant invoking shock therapy programmes in the interests of promoting radical 
economic freedom or establishing regimes which legitimised freedom of expression, even for 
                                                 
1 Fukuyama would likely reject the depiction of him as a liberal. However, for the purposes 
of this chapter, I am taking neoconservatism to be an offshoot of a broader family of ‘kinetic 
liberal interventionism’. On this, see Dodge (2009).  
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former communists, neo-Nazis and other unsavoury types. Not all anti-communist activists 
proved to be cuddly – xenophobic nationalists and market fundamentalists were just as 
implicated in the fall of communism as liberal intellectuals. Not only this, the experience of 
1989’s ‘heartland states’ over the past twenty years has served to illustrate the contradictions 
of revolutionary (in this case, liberal) utopianism in a way which will be familiar to students 
of past revolutions: the restrictions of political freedoms in order to provide security and 
order; the continued importance of state activism in the economic sphere in order to 
redistribute public goods, manage inequality and reduce other distortions of the market; and 
the requirement of a strong public sector which can curtail the abuses of uncivil society when 
it tends towards extremism and violence. Indeed, one of the ironies of 1989 has been 
exposure of the limits of unfettered political, economic and cultural liberalism. By ushering in 
an era of liberalism without critique, 1989 actually served to renew critiques of liberal 
utopianism, critiques which continue to gain strength both in the West and the wider world. 
These issues are tackled directly in this volume by John Hobson, William Outhwaite, Barbara 
Falk and Laure Delcour.  
A second question mark over the effects of 1989 focuses on the considerable 
continuities between old and new, whether seen in terms of state personnel or broader social 
relations. In his chapter for this volume, Aviezer Tucker examines the ‘privitisation of the 
nomenklatura’ in post-communist Russia and China, arguing that the late-totalitarian elite 
managed to align its interests (maximising wealth and status) to its rights, successfully 
transferring power from the political sphere to the economic realm. Tucker’s point is 
powerfully made. Although the newness of past revolutions is often exaggerated (Kumar 
1987; Halliday 1999; Lawson 2005), there is something particularly old-fashioned about the 
1989 variant. Rather than seeking to establish a new order, revolutionaries in 1989 rushed to 
embrace what they imagined the West to consist of: better politics (represented by pluralism 
and democracy), better culture (particularly in terms of music, fashion and food), and better 
economies (whether understood as Nordic or Anglo-Saxon variants of capitalism). Both old 
elites and activists approached the events from positions of mutual weakness – neither had 
the stomach for an extended conflict and neither had the capacity to win victory outright. As 
such, roundtables replaced guillotines. And roundtables provided plenty of scope for old 
regimes to transform themselves into new elites. Sunset clauses for the old guard, the 
restoration of ‘recovering communists’ in Russia, China and elsewhere (Jowitt 1992), and the 
emergence of so-called ‘red barons’ are common themes in those states which experienced 
negotiated transformations.  
 
7 
The third issue which clouds the revolutionary legacy of 1989 surrounds their limited 
use of violence. For many scholars and laypeople alike, the very essence of revolution lies in 
its violence. But such a view disguises a much more complex relationship between revolution 
and violence than is commonly understood. If violence and revolution are co-determinous, 
then of the 1989 revolutions, only the Romanian uprising would qualify as a revolution. Yet 
given the partial nature of social, political and economic change in Romania since 1989, it is 
difficult to see how it warrants the label revolution. Social change in the form of great 
scientific breakthroughs or widescale parliamentary reform programmes have no necessary 
link with violence. In fact, as Johan Galtung (1969) and others point out, violence in its 
structural forms such as repression, exploitation, marginalization, sexism, racism and so forth 
is used to suppress rather than instigate change. Violence is a means of order – the stifling of 
change – as much as a signifier of upheaval. Often, revolutions have been relatively peaceful 
seizures of power; violence stems from battles after the initial takeover of state power, 
resulting from the need by these regimes to shore up their rule in the face of domestic and 
international attempts at counter-revolution, a cycle that can be observed in France (in 
particular in the Vendée) after 1791, Russia during its four-year long civil war after 1917, and 
in Iran, by way of its war with Iraq and the brutal measures employed against the regime’s 
‘un-Islamic’ foes after 1980. Hannah Arendt (1963), in a survey of the connection between 
violence and revolution, found that violence only became associated with revolutionary 
change through the ‘Terror’ of the Jacobins during the French Revolution. The close link 
between revolution and violence is, therefore, a relatively modern connection. Violence has 
been neither a constant nor indispensable aspect of revolutions. And as such, the relative lack 
of violence in 1989 need not disqualify the transformations from being seen as revolutionary. 
Indeed, as Chris Armbruster makes clear in his chapter, the most significant legacy of 1989 
may be their provision of a novel means of organising synchronous political and social 
change without recourse to high levels of overt violence.  
Armbruster argues that it is best to see the events of 1989 as ‘negotiated revolutions’ 
(see also Lawson 2005). And certainly, the transformations succeeded in generating political, 
economic and social orders some way removed from their communist era predecessors: 
ideological monism gave way to open societies; the homogeneity of political life under 
communism was replaced by the pluralisation of political relations; and the tired, stagnant 
formula of central planning made way for the uncertainty of market relations. However, it 
would be foolish to claim that everything has changed in post-1989 orders. In reality, some 
power relations proved to be so entrenched as to be unalterable, other measures have been 
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blocked, and there are many things incoming elites neither wished nor attempted to change. 
No revolution can start from year zero and reinvent social structures from scratch. Rather, the 
story of revolutionary change, in 1989 as in other times, is bound up with compromise 
between social action and structural constraints, utopian ideals and the politics of the 
possible.  
If 1989, therefore, can be understood as the relatively peaceful victory of a 
revolutionary form of liberal utopianism, one which in keeping with past revolutions has 
witnessed continuities as well as important ruptures, what have been its principal legacies? 
As William Outhwaite notes in his chapter, one of the unintended consequences of 1989 has 
been a depression of left-wing politics in the West. To some extent, as Outhwaite points out, 
the events of 1968 in Europe and the emergence of a virulent form of economic neoliberalism 
in the 1980s begun these processes in the generation before 1989, but they were certainly 
underlined, reinforced and emboldened by the events of 1989. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to 
say that it is no longer clear what it means to be ‘left’ after the fall of actual existing 
socialism. The attempt to construct a Third Way by the Blair and Clinton administrations, as 
well as by their continental imitators, proved to be short-lived experiments, while the new 
Millennium saw the left fracture painfully and powerfully over international issues – 
something it appears to do in each generation. In the 1930s the split came over the Spanish 
Civil War and Stalinist purges; in the 1960s over the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 
1968 uprisings in Western Europe. In the noughties, the war on terror split the left on familiar 
issues: internationalism and imperialism, sovereignty and solidarity, universal aspirations and 
particular struggles. In more general terms, the left has turned away from issues of 
representation and redistribution in favour of those of recognition (Fraser 2008). This 
hollowing out of political and economic opposition in the West appears, at least in part, to 
have been met by renewed interest in issues abroad, whether this be campaigns for debt 
relief, the war on poverty, or the fostering of support for global civil society. These social 
movements are, of course, important. But as a substitute for a radically left-wing alternative 
to current conditions, they provide thin gruel indeed.   
In this sense, as Fred Halliday argues in his contribution, if 1989 was a failure for 
socialism, particularly in Europe, it can also be seen as defeat for liberal capitalism. The dark 
side of capitalist accumulation, captured powerfully in Saskia Sassen’s chapter, has been 
sharp increases in inequality and criminality – much of the world is poor and insecure. Most 
troublingly, it is clear that the 2008 financial crisis was not something external to the system, 
but a process which arose from a conjuncture of inefficiencies and perversities endemic to the 
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system itself, most notably the shift towards a form of ‘casino capitalism’ (Strange 1986).2 
The latest failure of capitalism was also a failure of the economics discipline – the ‘efficient 
market hypothesis’, ideas of ‘self-correction’ and support for no-holds barred deregulation 
became commonplace ideas within an economics profession that ‘mistook beauty for truth’ 
by employing a range of techniques which, although looking good on paper, turned out to 
bare little resemblance to how economies actually functioned (Krugman 2009). As Saskia 
Sassen notes, the 2008 crisis had its roots in fundamental shifts in ideas about, and practices 
of, the international political economy during the two decades preceding 1989. Indeed, the 
central ideas and ordering mechanisms of the contemporary international political economy 
(self-regulation, marketisation, neo-liberalism, privatisation etc.) were already ascendant – 
and had taken institutional form – well before 1989, hence the immediacy of shock therapy 
policies in (and on) 1989 heartland states. In general, the idealization of the market – by 
academics and policy makers alike – acted as a blinker on real world events; markets turned 
out not to be perfect and rationality turned out not be utilitarian, at least not much of the time. 
And the consequences of this utopian occlusion – on peoples, societies and markets around 
the world – proved to be painful in the extreme.  
Given this, it could be argued that 1989 should be understood as a conjunctural rather 
than an epochal shift (Rosenberg 2005). In other words, 1989 did not mark the emergence 
and institutionalisation of a novel set of political, economic and social relations. Rather, it 
emerged primarily out of collapse and implosion – the disappearance, virtually without a 
shot, of the Soviet Union and, with it, the final strand of the Cold War order, much of which 
had already melted away. The shifts and reconfigurations of social, economic and political 
power relations associated with 1989, dramatic and extensive though they have been, are for 
the most part contained within existing forms of social, political and economic order rather 
than marking a fundamental epochal transformation in the nature of these configurations. 
Those states and other actors at the centre of 1989 sought not to generate novel institutional 
alliances or to remake international relations in their own image but to actively give away 
power, for example by joining international organisation’s ranging from the European Union 
to International Financial Institutions such as the World Trade Organisation. To put this in 
old language, the organic tendencies of the old have reasserted themselves, in a new context, 
                                                 
2 Strange borrowed the idea of capitalism and, in particular, financial markets functioning as 
a casino (i.e. as a constant gamble based on ever riskier speculations) from perhaps the 
world’s most influential economist during the early part of the twentieth century, John 
Maynard Keynes. 
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and on a vaster scale. In more concrete terms, the failures of Western capitalism, political 
institutions and cultural mores since 1989 (Jentleson and Weber 2008; Khanna 2008; Zakaria 
2008) have fostered new forms of opposition to Western order: political Islam, freed from its 
focus on the communist enemy (Gerges 2007); Latin American populism, no longer subject 
to Western concerns over ‘extended deterrence’; and renewed forms of authoritarian rule in 
China and elsewhere, even if these now appear more as forms of political coercion than as 
alternative means of economic or ideological competition. In this sense, although the end of 
the Cold War has been felt mostly strongly in Europe, trends elsewhere have been both 
unanticipated and, on occasion, counter-cyclical. We have been here before, of course (e.g. 
Spengler 1926; Kennedy 1989). But this time, as Michael Cox and William Outhwaite both 
make clear, relative Western decline may be for real.  
 
The ‘When’ of 1989? 
If the above analysis stands up to scrutiny, 1989 marked neither a distinct end nor a distinct 
beginning in world historical time. Indeed, in ascertaining the time – or times – of 1989, it is 
important to ask when 1989 started, not in the sense of the opening of the border between 
Hungary and Austria in September 1989 which was decisive in extending protests against 
communist rule, nor in the sense of the landslide victory won by Solidarity in the June 1989 
elections in Poland (on the same day, so it happened, as the massacre in Tiananmen Square) 
which acted as an important stimulus for opposition movements throughout the region. This 
much we know. But part of any assessment of the impact of 1989 must consider which events 
it is to be judged against. For example, if we mark our temporal cards from 1945-1989, then 
the events appear to herald the end – or at least the winding down – of the Cold War, whether 
we consider this as a single frame with multiple dimensions (Westad 2005) or as divisible 
into two discrete stages (Halliday 1983). If, following Eric Hobsbawm (1994), we prefer to 
see the twentieth century as somehow ‘short’ – sandwiched between the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917 and the events of 1989, we get a second, more birds-eye, view on 
proceedings. And it is possible to go back still further: to 1848 and the Springtime of Nations 
(Völkerfrühling Wiosna Ludów), which, like 1989, also witnessed first-hand the mobilising 
force of nationalism, the apparently spontaneous eruption of protests in major European 
cities, the enduring power of ideas of freedom, equality and justice, and the (mostly peaceful) 
loss of nerve by the old guard; to 1789 as François Furet (1999) prefers, and what he 
considers to be the final burial of the modern revolutionary geist – or illusion – first 
witnessed in France; or perhaps to 1648 as some political theorists prefer, with 1989 marking 
 
11 
the end of an era of state sovereignty first ushered in by the Peace of Westphalia. Beyond 
Europe, there are still other alternatives. As Rick Saull notes in his chapter for this volume, 
the Cold War in the Middle East operated with logics distinct from its European variant: the 
relationship between authoritarian states backed by the United States and revolutionary forms 
of state nationalism supported, at least in part, by the Soviet Union; the various punctuation 
marks (1948, 1967, 1973, 1987) provided by the Arab-Israeli conflict; the fluctuating role of 
petro-dollars in regional politics; and the mobilising power of strands of political Islam. In 
short, if 1989 stands as a point of historical reckoning, much is staked in terms of when 
observers choose to start counting as well as when they decide to stop doing so.   
Many of the contributors to this book engage with the notion of 1989 as constituting 
some kind of ‘rectifying’, ‘recuperating’ or ‘catching up’ model of revolutionary change, an 
idea first associated with the German critical theorist Jürgen Habermas (1990) in the 
immediate aftermath of the revolutions. To some extent, Habermas has a point – 1989 did 
mark the end of a detour, albeit an exceptionally powerful one. State socialism matched 
liberal capitalism in offering a distinct take on what was considered to be the most authentic 
articulation of modernity: both were revolutionary creeds which sought to govern on this 
basis. In this sense, both liberal capitalism and state socialism can be seen as quintessentially 
modern. As such, it was no surprise to see ideas associated with the holy trinity of modern 
social theorists (Weber, Marx and Durkheim) appear both to explain 1989 and its 
consequences: from Weber, we saw the limits of the iron cage of bureaucratic rationality as 
captured not just by socialist state managers but also by their counterparts in the West and in 
international organisations; from Marx, we were reminded of the necessary inequities and 
exploitation inherent in the accumulative practices of industrial capitalism; and from 
Durkheim we could bare witness to the anomie of modern life – the lack of solidarist scripts 
that arise from the break-up of old forms of order (what the novelist Monica Ali calls ‘the 
limits of autonomy’), intensely present in both the contemporary West and post-1989 states. 
All in all, the events of 1989 reinvigorated many old debates about what it meant to be both 
human (Latour 1993) and modern (Gray 2007). In short, 1989 reawakened commentators to 
many of the contradictory aspects of modernity of which great modern theorists were well 
aware and which social science is charged to study.   
To some extent, therefore, dreams of a radical alternative to capitalism did fade after 
1989. But, for two reasons, such dreams were never realistic. First, one of the great mistakes 
of Marx’s theory (and, by association, those of neo-Marxists such as Immanuel Wallerstein) 
was its underestimation of capitalism’s capacity for ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 1942) 
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– the capacity of capitalism to conjure new, dynamic forms of accumulation and profit. In 
this sense, what did for state socialism was the shift in Western economies to consumer 
based, service led economies, the emergence of computer based technologies and the rise of 
financial innovations following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. 
Second, as Chris Armbruster notes in his chapter, state socialism contained chronic internal 
weaknesses. Stalinist purges, a militarised economy and the normalisation of revolutionary 
ideology into a self-perpetuating bureaucratic creed replete with its own ruling class – the 
nomenklatura – undermined the Soviet system from within. By 1968 or thereabouts, there 
were precious few communists – or at least Marxist-Leninists – left in the Eastern Bloc. A 
Czech professor returning to Prague in 1970 after two years in the Netherlands complained 
that ‘there were far too many communists over there. At least in Prague, I won’t have to meet 
any.’3 In this sense, what Isaac Deutscher (1960) described as ‘the great contest’ was 
anything but that, however it appeared to participants at the time. It was a contest which 
contained a pre-determined victor, something captured evocatively by the post-War US 
ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan (1947), in the long-telegram sent to his political 
masters at the onset of the Cold War. Gorbachev, ‘new thinking’ and other such événements 
were certainly significant in terms of the timing of Soviet collapse, but longer-term trends 
better explain how and why the system failed. We did not know precisely when communism 
would implode, but that it would at some point in time was not in question.  
In this sense, therefore, 1989 was an end – an end that Francis Fukuyama (1989) was 
at least half-right to see as that between two rival ideologies: liberal capitalism and state 
socialism. But the twenty years since 1989 have ably demonstrated the ways in which 
political, military, economic and cultural forces find ways to reconfigure themselves along 
new lines. Capitalism may be the only game in town in terms of organising economies, but 
this comes at the cost of recurring crisis, something painfully illustrated by the global 
meltdown of 2008. But if there is no economic alternative to capitalism, this is not the case 
when it comes to political relations. In fact, it is not clear whether capitalism thrives best 
under authoritarian or democratic forms of governance. After all, some of the most rapid 
periods of growth – and the most unyielding forms of capitalism – have occurred in 
authoritarian states (Chang 2007): contemporary China or General Pinochet’s Chile for 
example. As such, it is not just the European Union and the United States, but the ‘soft 
dictatorships’ (Kenney 2006) of China and Russia that offer powerful models for combining 
                                                 
3 A story told during a conversation with Profesor Jan Sokol at Charles University, Prague, 4 
April 2001. 
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order and wealth creation in the contemporary world (Gat 2007; for an alternative view, see 
Deudney and Ikenberry 2009). Culturally, along with a certain flattening of language, style, 
music and food lies a mix and match of various hues and colours, creative heterogeneous 
fusions even amidst a certain homogeneity of aspiration. Barack Obama’s Kenyan/Hawaiian 
origins are, in this sense, just the leading-edge of a much broader trend.  
Alongside these uncertainties regarding economic, political and cultural relations lie 
contradictions in terms of the world’s military relations, a process captured well by Marc 
Devore’s chapter for this volume. On the one hand, US military might provides it with full 
spectrum dominance on an unprecedented scale, something aided by organisations such as 
NATO, whose twenty-six members includes ten postcommunist states. On the other hand, 
this dominance is threatened by a certain democratisation in the means of violence – what can 
be seen as the ‘other side of the revolution in military affairs’. Indeed, the widespread 
availability of Kalashnikovs and hand-held rocket launchers, alongside techniques of 
asymmetrical warfare such as suicide bombing, provide the means for small, determined 
groups to hold out against US force and, indeed, to counter it effectively, as demonstrated by 
the events of 9/11 and the unsuccessful invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Devore traces this 
dynamic to the emergence of the revolution in military affairs in the final years of the Carter 
administration. Devore chronicles a fight between traditional military elites convinced of the 
need for modernisation within existing structural command and control systems, and political 
elites dazzled by the possibilities of high-tech warfare. In the final analysis, Devore 
concludes, the revolution in military affairs served as a utopian occlusion, blinding political 
leaders to the realities of military conflict which, regardless of stealth bombers, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), techniques of precision bombing and so on, remain gruesome fights 
to the finish.  
Such lessons – one of the ten chronicled by Barbara Falk in her chapter – stem from a 
delusion which appears to be shared by nigh-on the entire US political elite. As Falk notes, 
the fusion of overwhelming American power allied to powerful ideologies such as neo-
conservatism has engendered a sense in which US power is not just good for the United 
States, but also a tool which can – and should – be used to reshape the world in its own 
image. Of course, this powerful cocktail of power and utopian ideals has not gone 
unchallenged. First, there is the challenge to US military hegemony noted by Devore and 
others. Second, there is the political challenge to American primary represented by 
alternatives models of governance: China, Russia and, to some extent, the European Union. 
Third, although much of the world is led by – or wants to be led by – American cultural 
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trends, there is a certain unorthodox blend to this picture: Bollywood films, Chinese 
restaurants and other such global cultural formations are generating an increasingly complex, 
sometime hybridised, array of cultural forces. And economically, sovereign wealth funds, 
protectionist policies and forms of economic nationalism indicate a process of 
renationalisation, even as this sits alongside moves towards global, regional, transnational 
and local scapes (Mann 1997; Weiss 1998). In short, the most recent phase of capitalist 
accumulation is serving to fracture global space.  
 
The ‘Where’ of 1989? 
As Saskia Sassen notes in her chapter for this volume, the fracturing of spatial relations is not 
a new phenomenon, albeit one which is only now taking global shape. Indeed, as John 
Hobson and Rick Saull point out, the Cold War may only have appeared to delineate a 
certain singularity to world events because of a Eurocentric gaze on the conflict. After all, 
although the bipolar order was stable and relatively peaceful in Europe, this was not the case 
for many states and regions around the world where the post-1945 period was decidedly hot. 
In short, Europe was the central front of strategic and diplomatic calculations, but it was the 
Third World that generated the majority of the crises and nearly all of the casualties of the 
Cold War – over twenty million people all told. As Arne Westad (2005) puts it, both East and 
West imposed a ‘regime of global intervention’ which continued, at least to some extent, the 
exploitation of the colonial era. For the Soviets, this was premised on a general creed (albeit 
with Stalinist reservations) of revolutionary internationalism and a Leninist desire to attack 
capitalist via its weakest link. For the US, responses to Third World uprisings were captured 
by NSC-68 (which followed the outbreak of the Korean War), détente (at least in part 
formulated as a result of post-colonial revolutions), and the acceleration of the Cold War 
under Ronald Reagan’s administration in the early 1980s (undertaken, to some degree, 
because of the challenge posed by the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions and the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union). What James Mann (2009) calls ‘the rebellion of Ronald 
Reagan’ should, in this sense, be seen as a manifestation of a longer-term commitment by the 
United States to counter the Soviet challenge wherever it appeared.  
To some extent, therefore, the Cold War can be understood as an inter-imperialist 
rivalry (the Soviet ‘empire of justice’ vs. the US ‘empire of liberty’), as a contest between 
two revolutionary regimes, or, as noted above, as a confrontation between rival visions of 
modernity. But however it is described, as Fred Halliday points out, it was a conflict which, 
despite the chronic deficiencies which would eventually lead to its downfall, most 
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participants thought the Soviets could win. Indeed, even in the early part of the 1980s, the 
correlation of forces looked somewhat favourable for the Soviets: Tanzania, Algeria and 
Nicaragua were showcases for leftist progressivism; there was a general, much lauded, drive 
towards ‘Afrocommunism’ and, in 1982, at the moment of the death of Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev, the Soviet net stretched to thirty-one component states. This net included states run 
by Soviet clients (e.g. Cuba and Vietnam), states oriented towards socialism (e.g. Ethiopia 
and Nicaragua), two independent communist states (China and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea), a group of what the Soviets considered to be ‘less advanced states of 
socialist orientation’ (e.g. Algeria and Iraq), and several more marginal cases (e.g. Ghana and 
Surinam). Despite some of the more delusional aspects of these claims and regardless of 
structural Soviet weaknesses elsewhere, not least economically, there was good reason for the 
Reagan administration to develop a counter-offensive against what appeared as a picture of 
Soviet rude-health.   
However, as Halliday makes clear in his chapter, ‘recognising the global extent of the 
Cold War is not equivalent to saying that it was in the Third World that the global conflict 
was decided any more than recording military conflict in the Middle East or the Pacific 
during World Wars I and World Wars II is equivalent to saying that it was these theatres that 
decided the outcome’. Indeed, as both Laure Delcour and William Outhwaite also discuss, the 
most obvious centre of gravity for discussion of 1989 is Europe. And here, as elsewhere, 
consequences have been mixed. Although the European Union has expanded, this has not 
been without cost, whether this be to decision making capacities or a more general loss of 
nerve. The failure to ratify the proposed EU constitution and to deal effectively with 
important international processes in its near abroad (Georgia and Turkey in terms of foreign 
policy; the financial crisis in terms of economic policy) has left the Union curiously short of 
drive just as it appears to have maximised its basic capabilities. A certain sense of Ostalgie 
permeates European politics – and not just in the Eastern half of the continent. Despite 
attempts at ‘rethinking the left’ for the ‘new times’ after the end of the Cold War, there has 
been a pronounced turn towards anti-politics, a search for forms of political authenticity in 
older notions of ‘civil society’ and ‘moral economy’ and an accommodation with prevailing 
patterns of stratification and authority rather than the conjuring of novel ideals and policy 
prescriptions (Kumar 2001; European Journal of Social Theory 2009). 
To some extent, the desire of states to maintain control over their foreign and 
economic policies – despite claims to the contrary – stand as important markers of the post-
1989 world. There has been a certain renationalisation of security functions (for example via 
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new anti-terrorist legislation), economic policy (most credit crunch policy has either been 
state based or inter-state based) and identity politics (captured, for example, by the rise of 
anti-immigrant parties and movements). As with our understanding of time, therefore, 1989 
appears to have brought us a complex spatial panorama in which we are both closer in terms 
of an acceleration of intersocietal integration, particularly in terms of economies, peoples and 
ideas, but also further apart in that this homogenisation has a doppelgänger in the form of a 
return to the local, whether visited in claims of local autonomy, ethnic identity, or anti-
immigration. Again, therefore, there is a fundamental contradiction in play: combined 
interactivity alongside uneven differentiation; universality and fragmentation; singularity and 
fracture.  
Given this picture, it is difficult to establish any type of concrete hold on the multiple 
vectors which constitute contemporary global space. As Bob Jessop (2002, 2007) and others 
(e.g. Cerny 2006) argue, there is a new bargain emerging in terms of how states manage 
relations of regulation and accumulation, a process Jessop describes as a shift from 
Keynesian welfare states to Schumpterian workfare regimes. Part of this story, to be sure, is 
marked by a shift from national frames towards multinodal global, regional, transnational and 
local scales. We may not inhabit what Jürgen Habermas (2001) calls a ‘postnational 
constellation’, but there is a sense in which the fundamental relationships between states and 
markets, and between private and public spheres are being recast – a message which forms a 
core part of Saskia Sassen’s chapter. Of course, in and of itself, this is not a new 
phenomenon. Marx talked of capital’s ‘complex synthesis of multiple determinations’ in the 
Grundrisse some 150 years ago, while the liberal notion of complex interdependence remains 
a useful depiction for much of the functioning of the international political economy, 
reminding us that the picture is, to a great extent, issue- and/or region-specific (e.g. Keohane 
and Nye 1973).  
To some extent, therefore, as many contributors to this book note, there is a sense of 
plus ça change. Russia has, despite the emergence of previously submerged conflicts in 
Chechnya, Transdniestr, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, largely held 
together. Former communist parties have continued to win votes, sometimes, but not always, 
following a change of name.4 And for some states – China, North Korea, Cuba – the Cold 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, it was Western European rather than Eastern European communist parties 
which seemed most effected by the collapse of state socialism. The Italian communist party, 
for example, spent much of 1990 being called La Cosa (literally ‘the thing’) before settling 
on a new title – Partito Democratico Della Sinistra (the Democratic Party of the Left). In 
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War did not end, at least not in 1989/1991. As such, claims of a ‘new Cold War’ look far 
fetched (Buzan 2006). There will, no doubt, be a certain rescaling of global political order in 
order to accommodate the many challenges to Western international order. And perhaps, over 
the longue durée, the last 300-400 years of Western domination will come to be seen as an 
exception as power returns once more to Asia. In the meantime, we will continue to cast 
around for apt frames for the contemporary conjuncture, whether this is understood as 
imperial (e.g. Ferguson 2008; Hardt and Negri 2000), a case of ‘one superpower, many great 
powers’ (Kagan 2008), or as Richard Haass (2008) prefers, ‘nonpolar’.  
 
Conclusions and openings  
Yogi Berra, the famous American baseball player and pundit once said that, ‘it is tough to 
make predictions, especially about the future’. 1989 is no exception to his maxim. Some 
twenty years after the fall, it is difficult to recall the sense of surprise and excitement which 
emerged from the removal of the Soviet empire first in Eastern and Central Europe, and some 
two years later, from its own backyard. As the international media moved from city to city, 
and increasing numbers of Europeans came onto the streets in order to chase away the old 
order and to welcome in the new, there was a sense of the world shifting beneath people’s 
feet. In some ways, the events of 1989 stand as epigraphs for a ‘runaway world’ (Giddens 
2002) which precludes easy analysis. Perhaps world politics over the last twenty years has 
occupied some kind of ‘liminal space’ (Kumar 2001), serving as an ‘interregnum’ (Cox, 
Booth and Dunne (eds.), 1999) or as ‘abnormal times’ (Fraser 2008). More likely, though, the 
Cold War only appears simple in retrospect. For those who lived through the period, the Cold 
War seemed anything but straightforward and the outcome of the conflict anything but 
certain, even during its final endgame. As such, this book does not seek to provide a ‘post-
factum’ flattening of the Cold War into a monochrome story with a pre-determined outcome. 
Rather, the contributors seek to question how effectively the end of the Cold War works as a 
tool of ‘temporal othering’ between old and new, and indeed, between good and bad.   
However imperfect any simple frame (e.g. East-West) is for understanding the 
complexities of international politics between 1945 and 1989/1991, it is clear that this 
conflict ended because of the defeat of one of the competitors by the other. And what 
followed was not the replacement of the Soviet Union by a single foe but by a multitude of 
                                                                                                                                                        
contrast, both the Czech and Hungarian communist parties continued to function as normal, 
more or less unapologetically. Indeed, today, of nineteen parties associated with the 
‘European Left’ movement, eight are former communist parties.  
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contenders: authoritarian capitalists, virulent nationalists, Islamic terrorists and more. Given 
this picture, it is unsurprising that our concepts and frames have struggled to keep up. At the 
heart of understanding the global 1989 are striking contradictions: heightened interactivity 
alongside increased differentiation, simultaneous closeness and distance, the homogeneity of 
globalisation alongside the fracturing of public space. Such is both the blessing and curse of 
1989: it has allowed us to leave behind some of the more obscuring, constraining blinkers of 
the pre-1989 era. But it has not yet offered us much in their place. We are in an era where we 
know what we are post (Cold War, Westphalian, imperial and so on), but have little sense of 
where we are and what is to come. In this sense, the post-Cold War era offers a profound 
lesson for academic enquiry as well as for policy makers, reminding us of the need to ask 
good questions rather than look for easy answers, to use imagination rather than fulfil the 
requirements of ‘normal science’, and to work on developing sound judgements rather than 
following the latest fad. Our task in this book is to both problematise the place of 1989, but 
also to make sense of the major trends which have arisen from it over the past twenty years.  
To that end, one of the central arguments in this book is that 1989 represents, at least 
for the most part, a triumph of chronos (sequential time) over kairos (qualitative temporal 
change) (Hutchings 2008). Although there have been, and there remain, claims to the 
exceptional in 1989, a fundamental rupture in world order does not appear to have taken 
place. Rather, much akin to the bionic man, the post-1989 era is quicker, stronger, faster – we 
have seen the acceleration of important reconfigurations in how we organise politics, 
economics and social life, but also the emergence of some curious contradictions: the linear 
time of the Cold War replaced by a fractured time of uneven development; the end and then, 
more recently, the return of history (Kagan 2008); the emergence of simultaneous time 
alongside a sense of temporal dislocation. For all its surprise, 1989 did not spring de novo, 
but had antecedents – 1789, 1848 and 1968 amongst them. And it has generated its own 
mimicries, from negotiations between Maoists and old regimes loyalists in Nepal to second 
generation authoritarian transformations in Serbia and elsewhere. 1989 also faces competition 
from other dates which stand as way-stations on important trends in contemporary world 
politics, not least 1979, marker of both the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, events which, via many twists and turns, provided impetus to the development 
of radical political Islam and US neoconservatism. The joining of these radical ideologies in 
armed conflict has engendered a new revolutionary conflict, one which will shape core 
aspects of world politics for many years to come. In this sense, it is not Viktor Yushchenko or 
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Nelson Mandela, Hugo Chavez or Naomi Klein who best personify the present conjuncture, 
but Irving Kristol, Abu Musab al-Suri and their fellow-travellers.  
Given this, much as it is important to recognise the importance of 1989, one of the 
lessons of this book is that years and dates rarely acts as sound guides to complex processes. 
In fact, rather like seeking to capture democracy only via elections, dates may serve to 
obscure more important, longer-term trends. In short, dates offer us punctuation marks to 
world history, but they should not be seen as the masters of world historical development. 
Our goal in this book is to draw together trends that, quite often, are seen only in parallel or 
as zero-sum: homogenisation and heterogeneity; modernity and jihad; Stalinist terror and 
Gorbachevian ‘new thinking’. Each chapter in the book disrupts a prevailing wisdom and 
exposes ‘uncomfortable truths’ – in this sense, they represent high-water marks of academic 
enquiry and critical engagement. Of course, no book can – or should – close down a 
particular subject, and this is no exception. There are a range of topics not dealt with here: 
detailed survey of the normative landscape of the post-Cold War world, attention to the re-
masculination of public space which has accompanied a relative decline in the position of 
women globally, and the emergence of the ‘dark side of globalisation’ as represented by 
people trafficking, transnational criminal networks, the illicit drugs trade and so on (Halliday 
2008). And there are many regions which have, at least in terms of extended discussion, 
slipped beneath our radar. What we offer, therefore, is not a definitive guide, but a series of 
openings about one of the iconic historical landmarks of our time. ‘Out of the crooked timber 
of humanity’, Kant wrote, ‘no straight thing was ever made’. Our intention in this book is not 
to carve a straight line out of humanity’s crooked timber. But we do aim to make sense of the 
complexities, contradictions and paradoxes of the post-1989 world. Ten years ago, a major 
study claimed that, following 1989, ‘everything we know is up for grabs and what comes 
next is anyone’s guess (Verdery 1999: 83). This book seeks to provide the clarity afforded by 
an extra decade of hindsight.  
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